Emotion and Cognition: Research That Connects

Historically, emotion has been seen as completely separate from cognition.

Lev Vygotsky (1962, p.8) believes that the separation of affect from cognition "is a major weakness of traditional psychology since it makes the thought process appear as an autonomous flow of 'thoughts thinking themselves,' segregated from the fullness of life, from the personal needs and interests, the inclinations and impulses, of the thinker." This separation was the result of research choices made as the field of cognitive psychology was first ramping up. These early cognitive scientists were faced with the question of how to handle quantitatively messy emotions in their experimental designs. Some chose to manipulate emotions and examine those effects, while most chose to keep emotions constant in order to ignore them as they focused on thinking (Pett, 2000). Out of this research tendency grew the idea that humans were problem solvers like computers. Thus affect was seen as "a regrettable flaw in an otherwise perfect cognitive machine" (Scherer, as quoted in McLeod, 1991).

Vygotsky (1962, p.8) went on to say, "Such segregated thought must be viewed either as meaningless epiphenomenon incapable of changing anything in the life or conduct of a person of else as some kind of primeval force exerting an influence on personal life in an inexplicable, mysterious way." While Vygotsky paints an unsure picture of thinking without emotion, Joseph LeDoux (1996, p. 25) sees a bleak reality without emotion, "Cognitive science emerged recently, around the middle of this century, and is often described as the 'new science of the mind.' However, in fact, cognitive science is really a science of only a part of the mind, the part having to do with thinking, reasoning, and intellect. It leaves emotion out. And minds without emotions are not really minds at all. They are souls on ice - cold, lifeless creatures devoid of any desires, fear, sorrow, pains, & pleasures."

As researchers have begun to consider LeDoux's notion of the whole mind, the connections between cognition and emotion have emerged as fuzzy if not completely confusing. At the Carnegie Symposium in 1981, Herbert Simon claimed, "I have some impression, in moving from one paper to the next, that we are indeed the traditional blind men, now touching one part of the elephant, now another. Affect is a word of everyday language that is subject to the impression of all such words--perhaps to more imprecision than most. Its various meanings are connected--that's how they arose in the first place--but not synonymous" (as quoted in McLeod, 1991). Although researchers are beginning to look at Simon's elephant in better light, those in North America are battling a division between emotion and cognition which has been codeified in many walks of life. This codification points to emotion as being independent of cognition, irrational, spontanous, natural, physical, irrepresible, and vital to express. These ideas are pervasive as illustrated in laws which differentiates punishments for crimes of passion and crimes which are pre-meditated (Ratner, 2000)

Ultimately, "the old distinctions among emotion, reason, and aesthetics are like the earth, air, and fire of an ancient alchemy. We will need much better concepts than these for a working psychic chemistry" (Minsky, as quoted in Sloman, 1998). The theories described here are the beginnings of my trying to understand the old distinctions and perhaps even to make new distinctions between emotion and cognition.


Some researchers believe that cognition and emotion occur consecutively.

Since 1980, Zajonc has been considered one of the leaders of those believing that cognition occurs before emotion. Zajonc found that each stimulus undergoes an initial processing to assess its affective tone, such as positive vs. negative or safe vs. threatening. Thus cognition occurs subsequent to any affective action (Pett, 2000). Others have found that the intensity of emotions is dependent on cognition. Thus, all sensations are cognitively interpreted before an emotional response is felt. For example, upon seeing a bear, the amount of fear felt by an individual will be proportional to an estimate of the likelihood of an attack, the amount of harm that could be caused during that attack, and the ability of that person to defend himself. Similarly, when an individual loses her job, her degree of fear will depend on the cognitively determined cultural importance of holding a job and the self-esteem as a result (Ratner, 2000). This idea was reinforced by Ratner in 1991, (for more information from 1991) as he realized that complex, modulated emotions rest on extensive cognitive activity (Ratner, 2000).

In 1974, Dutton & Aron conducted an experiment where male subjects were questioned after crossing two bridges over a canyon. One group crossed a rope bridge and the other crossed a more stable bridge. All were asked by an attractive female investigator to tell a story after they crossed. Those who used the scarier, rope bridge composed stories that were more highly sexually arousing (as a known interpretation of fear arousal) than those who used the more stable bridge. The results pointed to the men cognitively assessing the emotions felt during their bridge-crossing (Pett, 2000). Similarly, in 1982, Lazarus believed that cognitive appraisal is the most important function of the mind. This view was the opposite of Zajonc's. Lazarus found that cognitive denial and intellectualizing can reduce stress that is already being felt. Furthermore, he found that a person may go through primary and secondary appraisals, as well as re-appraisals (Pett, 2000). Experiments conducted by Izard in 1984 (for more research from 1984) found that an induced emotional state hampered performance on cognitive tasks (Coles, 1999).


Other researchers feel that emotion is central to cognition.

In fact, many researchers turned away from the idea of emotion and cognition occuring consecutively. Instead they turned toward the idea that emotion and cognition were different aspects of the same thing and called for attention to be paid to these concepts as such (Fleckenstein, 1991) (Coles, 1999) (Ratner, 2000). One even cautions against believing emotions could exist without the mediation of cognition: "We may be fascinated by intense feelings however we should not be deluded into thinking that they have an independent existence apart from cognition. They are as dependent on cognition as weak feelings are" (Ratner, 2000). In 1988 (for more information on 1988), Fiedler found that meaning became more salient for people who felt uncertainty (Kaufman 1996). This also points to a connection between cognitive meaning and emotional states.

As early as 1895, Dewey argued that the experiences we call emotions are actually interruptions in our behavior where two response tendencies conflict with each other or cause tension back and forth. He placed emotional experience at the core of rational behavior and believes that emotion is the product of rationality, not its antithesis, as others at the time believed (Dewey, 1895). Later, he applies this idea to education with a call to educate the whole child (Dewey, 1938).

Egan, in 1979, wrote that emotions are a point of entry to external worlds. His belief was further supported by Oatley in 1992 who claimed that when an individual runs across a puzzle, emotions can guide her to a solution (Kaufman, 1996).

In 1987 Vygotsky also saw the benefit of emotions as tied to cognition. He believed that it is important to know emotional underpinnings in order to understand any thinking. He could not fathom thinking as an "autonomous stream" separate "from the full vitality of life, from the motives, interests, and inclinations of the thinking individual." Furthermore, he found that each idea contains residue from the individual's affective relationship with that idea (Coles, 1999). In other words, "emotions do not cause thinking to be non-objective; they can motivate a passionate concern for objectivity" (Ratner, 2000).


Some researchers look to evolution to explain the relationship between emotion and cognition.

In this way, they are able to explain emotional response in terms of adaptation (Sloman, 1998). The fact that a rapid response is good for survival leads some to believe that "a rich theory of the emotions naturally emerges out of the core principles of evolutionary psychology" (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000).


Others believe that emotional responses can be explained through biology.

Thinking seems voluntary and learned. It can be controlled and is dependent upon cultural symbols and concepts. On the other hand, emotions seem so natural that many believe they must be governed by biology. This would account for the feeling that our emotions are beyond our control; because they are autonomic (Ratner, 2000).

Some researchers who rely on biology have found that emotion and cognition are functions of the same system. Damasio, in 1994, found that the same neural network is used for both emotion and cognition. Specifically the neural substrates for cognitive responses that are associated with emotion are acquired connections emerging from the unique experiences of individuals (Coles 1999). Furthermore he posits that emotion is central to the process of rational thought and is a key element of learning and decision making (Lemonick, 1995). For example, Damasio (as quoted in Lemonick, 1995) says, "We can't decide whom we're going to marry, what savings strategy to adopt, where to live, on the basis of reason along."

Some evolutionary psychologists go so far as to place emotion in a controlling role. According to Cosmides & Tooby (2000), emotions orchestrate all of the mind's subfunctions in order to avoid cacophony and self-defeat when faced with certain triggering situations.

LeDoux (1996) agrees that either emotion of cognition must take a controlling role, but he finds that sometimes one controls behavior more than the other. For example, the emotional subsystem is critical in conscious information processing, moderating attention, and informing the cognitive subsystem regarding feedback and eliciting responses. These systems can be thought of as being controlled by mental switching stations, called convergence zones, that provide access to information and relate it to other relevant data in both the emotional and cognitive subsystems (Lemonick, 1995). Although some sort of control seems to be taking place, the emotional and cognitive subsystems operate parallel to one another.

Other researchers believe that certain emotional responses and memories can be formed without invoking the conscious, cognitive system at all because the emotional system at times can behave independently (Coles 1999). Still others take the biology into consideration but see, instead, humans creatively adapting to their environment, unconstrained by biological mechanisms that would dictate a fixed response (Ratner, 2000).


Still others see emotions as stemming from physiological responses.

As early as 1890, James & Lange situated all emotions in bodily sensations. For example, they wrote that when a person sees a bear, her body responds with trembling. As a result, she gets afraid (Pett, 2000). LeDoux (1996) saw support for the James-Lange theory in coupling biology with physiology while examining brain function. Our brains can detect danger before we even experience the feeling of being afraid. The brain initiates physical responses before we associate these responses with feelings of fear. He found that emotional responses are hard-wired into the brain's circuitry but that the things that make us emotional are learned through experience. He recounts a story of Charles Darwin testing his physiological and emotional responses when closely facing a puff adder in a glass case. When the adder struck at him, Darwin jumped backward, away from the case. He observed, "My will and reason were powerless against the imagination of danger which had never been experienced" (LeDoux, 1996).

Maranon questioned James & Lange's theory in 1924 after conducting an experiment where 240 subjects were injected with adrenaline. 71% of the subjects felt jumpy but not anxious, leading to the conclusion that physiology does not always lead to an emotional response (Pett, 2000). Cannon-Bard also questioned the James-Lange theory and determined that physiological response feedback is not fast enough to explain emotional responses (Pett, 2000). Considering this research and his own, in 1964, Schachter found that both cognitive and physiological elements are important in determining emotion (Pett, 2000).


Emotional responses rely on an individual's interpretations of context.

In 1978, Solomon combined a biological approach with a look at the context in which the subsystems work. He viewed an emotion as "a network of conceptual and perceptual structures in which the objects and people in our world, others' actions and our own, are given significance." These emotions are not isolated judgments, but rather are a system of judgments which is a sub-system of all of the ways a person views the world (Ratner 2000).

Weiner & Graham focused on how an individual student views the world. They experimented in schools with students who had scored poorly on a quiz. If the teacher expressed guilty feelings over a poorly constructed quiz, the student felt a lesser degree of sadness and concern over the low score. If the teacher expressed angry feelings at the poor performance of the class, the student felt sadness and concern. As a result, they found that the students' perceptions of their teacher's emotional states was very important in their own emotional well-being (Coles 1999).

Kagan, writing in 1988, viewed emotion as part of cultural-cognitive processes with emotions having no independent causes or characteristics (Ratner 2000). Also writing in 1988, Branscombe pointed out that the same individual may react in an emotionally charged way in one situation and not in another. Thus, context makes a difference in emotion (Kaufman 1996). This work begs the question of whether or not the individual interprets the context through cognition.


Emotional responses vary based on culture.

Although people have express emotions physically, these physical forms can be difficult to interpret. For example, a display of happiness could be based on either a release of tension or a thrill, both emotions taking the same physical appearance. Also, individuals demonstrate varied bodily expressions for the same emotion, like a red face or crying when upset. Because this physical manifestation of emotion is weak, people must rely more on culture to interpret emotions based on physical forms (Ratner, 2000).

In 1990 Brenneis worked with rural Fiji Indians and found that this culture differentiates between social emotions and individual emotions. Social emotions are those that are constructed through social interaction like camaraderie. This emotion is experienced only by men who participate in the social interactions. Brenneis also found that emotions for the Fiji Indians were not considered internal states as we commonly think of them. Rather emotions are expressive acts. For this reason, individual emotions are seen as being unstable and having little value (Ratner, 2000).

Russell pointed out that numerous peoples have no word or concept for emotion. These cultures integrate emotion with thinking, and other affective states such as attitude, motive, behavior, and fate (Ratner, 2000).